Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, it is said, is obliged to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, till it be entirely subdued, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, antient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this supposed pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been displayed to the best advantage: The blindness, inconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on. In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavor to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.

The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us information. I believe it scarce will be asserted, that the first species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action. As its proper province is the world of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of realities, demonstration and volition seem, upon that account, to be totally removed, from each other. Mathematics, indeed, are useful in all mechanical operations, and arithmetic in almost every art and profession: But it is not of themselves they have any influence: Mechanics are the art of regulating the motions of bodies to some designed end or purpose; and the reason why we employ arithmetic in fixing the proportions of numbers, is only that we may discover the proportions of their influence and operation. A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? but that he may learn what sum will have the same effects in paying his debt, and going to market, as all the particular articles taken together. Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects; which leads us to the second operation of the understanding.

It is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. It is also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But it is evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. It is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It can never in the least
concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the
causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us,
their connection can never give them any influence; and it is plain, that as reason is
nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects
are able to affect us.

Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer,
that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing
the preference with any passion or emotion. This consequence is necessary.
It is impossible reason could have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving
an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it operated
alone, would have been able to produce volition. Nothing can oppose or retard the
impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from
reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able
to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence,
it is impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep
the mind in suspense a moment. Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our
passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense.
We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of
reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend
to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat
extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations.

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and
contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence
or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that
emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or
more than five foot high. It is impossible, therefore, that this passion can be opposed by,
or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the
disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

What may at first occur on this head, is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or
reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding
only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so
far as they are accompanied with some judgment or opinion. According to this
principle, which is so obvious and natural, it is only in two senses, that any affection
can be called unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy,
despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which
really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose means
insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and
effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means
insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. It is not
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of
my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least
uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. It is as little contrary to
reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have
a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain
circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most
valuable enjoyment; nor is there anything more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics.
to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. In short, a passion must be accompanied with some false judgment in order to its being unreasonable; and even then it is not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.

The consequences are evident. Since a passion can never, in any sense, be called unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses means insufficient for the designed end, it is impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions. The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desired good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the proposed effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me.

It is natural for one, that does not examine objects with a strict philosophic eye, to imagine, that those actions of the mind are entirely the same, which produce not a different sensation, and are not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception. Reason, for instance, exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion; and except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtilties of the school, scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness. Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquility, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first view and appearance. Now it is certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such. When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are supposed to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood. Their nature and principles have been supposed the same, because their sensations are not evidently different.

Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself. When I am immediately threatened with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion.

The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: It is not therefore the present
uneasiness alone, which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire. From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.